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FROM : AmEmbassy BONN

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON

DESP. NO.

July 22, 1959

DATE

REF : Tripartite Berlin Contingency Planning Paper of April 4, 1959; Bonn's D-1741, June 30, 1959; Bonn's D-1784, May 29, 1959; Bonn's D-1742, May 21, 1959

ACTION For Dept. Use Only	DEPT.	IN F O	OTHER					
				REC'D	7/28	CIA	OSO	Army Navy Air

SUBJECT: Berlin Contingency Planning-Air Access: Paragraph 12b, Tasks 4 & 5

The French, UK, and US Embassies in Bonn have agreed on the texts of the two papers forming enclosures to this despatch. Enclosure #1 (Task 4) concerns the supply of the Allied Berlin garrisons by air, and Enclosure #2 (Task 5) deals with the substitution of aircraft under Allied military control for the civil aircraft now operating between Berlin and the FedRep.

These papers are submitted to the Department for transmittal to the Tripartite Working Group in Washington for further action, and are being forwarded separately to LIVE OAK for General Norstad's comments.

DECLASSIFIED
Authority: AD 901048
By: HR-m/SS, WADA, Date: 5/30/91

David K. E. Bruce

David K. E. Bruce
Ambassador

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POL:WRTyler

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Enclosures:

1. Task 4 Paper
2. Task 5 Paper

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BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING - AIR ACCESS

Ref: Tripartite Paper, dated April 4, para 12(b) 4

Paper Agreed by the Three Embassies, Bonn

The Task:

Task 4 is defined in the tripartite paper of April 4 as follows:

"12(b) The three Embassies at Bonn in consultation with the tripartite staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate should review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following aspects of the Berlin air access question:-

- (4) Possible establishment of a "Garrison Airlift" to transport Allied personnel and material as necessary in the event of an interruption of Allied surface traffic."

1. General Considerations

- A. The interruption of Allied surface military access to Berlin, for whatever reason, might require the Allies to maintain logistic support of their Berlin garrisons by air. Such an operation would be independent of other Allied actions taken to restore ground access. The "Tripartite Garrison Air Lift Plan", dated November 24, 1958, developed at Bonn, provided the basic guidance for the existing detailed "Garrison Airlift" plans prepared by the three Air Forces. These plans assume that the needs of each Allied Berlin garrison force can be lifted unilaterally with no tripartite organization required, however, a Central Agency should be established, in order to provide tripartite operational coordination.
- B. With the development of "Civil Airlift" plans (Task 5), which contemplate the substitution of aircraft under Allied military control for the presently scheduled civil flights between Berlin and the FedRep, should the latter cease as a result of Soviet/GDR action, "Garrison Airlift" planning (Task 4) should be focused solely on the requirements of the Allied garrisons. Provision for "non-Allied Essential" and "non-official travelers" (Categories 7 & 5 of the November 24, 1958 Tripartite Garrison Airlift Plan), which include refugees, German mail, and normal air passengers, should, with the exception of German mail, be made in the "Civil Airlift" plan, rather than in the operational "Garrison Airlift" plans, as at present.
- C. Since the contingencies which these plans, "Garrison Airlift" and "Civil Airlift", are designed to meet are completely different and can occur independently of each other, each operation should

be planned for separately. The two operations can merge whenever both must be mounted. At that time, the Central Tripartite Coordinating Agency (para A, above) should be merged with the Combined Operational Headquarters established under the Civil Airlift Plan (see Tripartite Task 5 Paper para 1C), or with the QBAL CALTAF (see QBAL Plan), as appropriate.

D. It is assumed that the following conditions would obtain at the time a "Garrison Airlift" is mounted.

- 1) Normal civilian surface access to Berlin is unimpeded,
- 2) The civil airlines are still maintaining normal scheduled services to Berlin,
- 3) If the civil airlines are not flying, the "civil airlift" (Task 5) is in operation, so that a combined "Garrison-Civil Airlift" would ensue,
- 4) The Soviets/GDR will probably attempt to jam nav aids and communications facilities, and may resort as well to other forms of indirect and direct interference with Allied flights to Berlin (see Tripartite Tasks 2 & 6 Paper, dated June 30, 1959).

2. Operational Requirements

A. Essential Transport Needs of the Allied Garrisons in Berlin

1) Category One (U.S. Garrison)

Passengers - 100 official each way (25 duty, 75 leave)
Material - 60 tons inbound and 10 tons outbound (i.e.,
5 sorties inbound and 2 outbound with C-125s or 6
sorties inbound and 3 outbound with C-130s)

2) Category Two (U.K. Garrison)

Passengers - 45 official each way
Material - 44½ tons inbound and 5 tons outbound (i.e., 5
sorties inbound and 1 outbound using Beverlies or 9
inbound and 2 outbound using Hastings)

3) Category Three (French Garrison)

Passengers - 41 official each way
Material - 21 tons inbound and 2 tons outbound (i.e., 6
sorties inbound and 1 outbound using Nordatlas or
equivalent)

B. German Mail

If the civil airlines are operating, no airlift requirement will exist for handling the 50 tons of mail now transported daily by the US military train. The German Government will make its own arrangements for the transport of this mail. If neither the the US train nor the civil airlines are operating, this mail should be carried by the combined "Garrison-Civil Airlift". The "Garrison Airlift" plan should cover this contingency.

3. Allied Course of Action

Retain but modify the presently existing unilateral operational "Garrison Airlift" plans that have been prepared by the three Air Forces. The revised plans should provide only for the transport of required personnel and material for the Allied garrisons in Berlin. Other Berlin air transport requirements, short of the full airlift (QBAL), should be satisfied by the use of scheduled civil aircraft or by the military substitution therefor, i.e., the "Civil Airlift", until such time as a combined "Garrison-Civil Airlift" is necessary. Present commitments for the air transport of non-Allied requirements under existing "Garrison Airlift" plans should continue until operational "Civil Airlift" plans which include them are complete.

Operational planning should be coordinated to the extent necessary to provide for tripartite phasing into a combined "Garrison-Civil Airlift", and also ensure smooth ultimate absorption by the full airlift (QBAL) should this become necessary.

4. Conclusion

The three Ambassadors conclude that this paper should/^{be} referred to the three Governments, and to the Tripartite Working Group in Washington, for a policy decision on the advisability of mounting a "Garrison Airlift" as suggested, and to the three Air Forces for the necessary modification of their unilateral Garrison Airlift plans in conjunction with their preparation of operational "Civil Airlift" plans.

BERLIN CONTINGENCY PLANNING - AIR ACCESS

Ref: Tripartite Paper dated April 4, 1959, para 12(b) 5
Paper Agreed by the Three Embassies, Bonn

The Task:

Task 5 is defined in the tripartite paper of April 4, as follows:

"12(b) The three Embassies at Bonn in consultation with the tripartite staff in Paris or with other military headquarters as appropriate should review or complete contingency planning to deal with the following aspects of the Berlin air access question:-

- (5) The possible substitution of military for civil aircraft to maintain air services to Berlin if civil aircraft cease operations."

1. Policy Considerations

A. Short of a complete blockade of Berlin (which could result in mounting QBAL plan) two air contingency situations present themselves:

- 1) Civil airlines cease operating as a result of Soviet/GDR actions:
Planned Response - Civil Airlift (This paper, Task 5, deals with this contingency)
- 2) Allied surface access interrupted for whatever reason:
Planned Response - Garrison Airlift (see: Tripartite Task 4 Paper)

These contingencies could occur independently of each other and should be planned for separately. The two operations could be merged if both contingencies arose.

B. The Allies are agreed that the maintainance of scheduled air services between Berlin and the FedRep is of sufficient importance, politically and psychologically, to warrant the substitution of aircraft under Allied military control for normally scheduled commercial aircraft which may cease operations between Berlin and the FedRep as a result of Soviet/GDR actions.

- 1) In order to maintain Allied rights of air access to Berlin it is important that all three air corridors be utilized by these scheduled substitute flights.
- 2) The burden of maintaining substitute flights should be borne equally by the Three Powers.

C. The individual relationship between each Government and its national airline company, the differing legal situation in each country, and the probability that each will employ different methods in obtaining the aircraft and crews required for a "Civil Airlift" may initially necessitate three unilateral plans.

The closest operational coordinational will, however, be required for a workable "Civil Airlift", including the designation of a single commander and the establishment of combined operational headquarters.

- D. All planning for this contingency should contemplate its possible merger with the "Garrison Airlift" at some point, as well as the desirability of allotting commitments in such a way and creating an air organization so arranged, that all of this activity can be immediately absorbed by the full airlift (QBAL) should this become necessary.
- E. It must be assumed that the Soviets/GDR will probably attempt to jam nav aids and communications facilities, and may resort as well to other forms of indirect and direct interference with Allied flights between Berlin and the FedRep. (see: Tripartite Task 2 and 6 Paper, July 30, 1959)

2. Operational Requirements

- A. The "Civil Airlift" should be designed to maintain as normal a flow of air traffic for German and other civilians as possible between Berlin and the FedRep and handle refugees now carried by civil airlines.

Daily requirements are estimated as:

- 1) 1000 seats each way.
- 2) 180 refugees (outbound only)

- B. Suggested tripartite division of this expected load is as follows:

- 1) Passenger/km traffic (one way) between Berlin and the FedRep

	<u>PASSENGERS</u>	<u>DISTANCE</u>	<u>PASSEN- GERS/KM</u>	<u>FROM</u>	<u>TO</u>	<u>CORRIDOR</u>
France	200	262	52,400	Hamburg	Berlin/Tempelhof	North
	110	431	47,500	Frankfurt	Berlin/Tempelhof	South
	<u>310</u>		<u>99,900</u>			
UK	<u>430</u>	251	<u>108,000</u>	Hannover	Berlin/Tempelhof	Central
US	<u>260</u>	431	<u>112,000</u>	Frankfurt	Berlin/Tempelhof	South

- 2) It is contemplated that each "Civil Airlift" aircraft under military control will be fully utilized permitting close to a 100% load factor.

- 3) Since the FedRep maintains facilities for processing refugees at Hannover/Langenhagen, it may be necessary for the US and/or France to operate certain special flights between Berlin and Hannover in order to equitably share the burden of this special traffic.

3. Allied Course of Action

Complete the unilateral "Civil Airlift" plans now under preparation by the three Air Forces. The completed plans should contemplate the maintenance of as normal a flow of civilian travelers to leave Berlin as possible and the air transport of refugees (outbound only). The needs of the Berlin Garrisons and mail now handled by the US Military train will be satisfied through the "Garrison Airlift" if required.

4. Conclusion

The three Ambassadors conclude that this paper ^{should} be referred to the Tripartite Working Group in Washington for an early policy decision on the advisability of mounting a "Civil Airlift" as suggested at such time as civil air carriers cease operating as result of Soviet/GDR action, whether or not Allied ground access is simultaneously interrupted.